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Introduction
Most of the formal analyses of corporate risk management decisions (for example Froot and Stein (1998), , and Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011)) describe a single price-taking …rm that faces volatile cash ‡ows and optimizes its mix of reserves (cash or debt capacity) and derivatives instruments (forward and options).
In many instances, this analysis constitutes a valid representation of reality. Firms producing commodities and raw materials (e.g., metals and minerals, oil and gas, electric power) face output price volatility that translates directly into cash ‡ow volatility. In many industries, such as manufacturing, food processing, transportation, and energy retailing, …rms face input prices, not output prices, volatility. When …rms have no market power in their product market, the single-…rm risk management logic applies. Individual hedging demand from these price-taking …rms can then be aggregated to determine If, however, …rms facing input price volatility have some degree of market power in their product market, their strategies become more elaborate. For example, a …rm can pass through to customers a portion of the input cost increase and/or can retain a portion of the input cost decrease. However, by modifying product price, the …rm alters the competitive dynamics in its industry. It must therefore take into account the behavior of other …rms, and the pass-through is determined in equilibrium.
The British electric power retailing sector provides a clear example of hedging arising as an equilibrium. The British regulator (Ofgem (2008) , page 10) indicates that: "there is evidence that the (6 largest suppliers) seek to benchmark their hedging strategies against each other in order to minimize the risk of their wholesale costs diverging materially from the competition".
Private conversations with key participants of the industry con…rm that each expands considerable competitive intelligence e¤ort to estimate the others' hedging position. Retailers then play a symmetric Nash equilibrium. What matters to them is not the absolute value of their hedging position, but its value relative to their competitors.
This article examines how hedging interacts with product market strategy when …rms compete in quantity (Cournot) and in price (Bertrand di¤erenti-ated).
In the economics and …nance literature, various authors have developed models where …rms jointly determine their hedging ratios as a Nash equilibrium. Closest to this work, Allaz and Villa (1993) examine the interplay of forward and spot markets, and …nd that the availability of forward contracts reduces …rms'market power in the spot market. However, their analysis differs from ours in a critical aspect: in their setting, …rms sell their output on the forward or spot markets, where they exert market power, while in ours, …rms exert no market power in the spot and forward markets for input.
Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) examine two-period games in the presence of …nancial constraints: …rms'hedging decision in the …rst-period a¤ect their investment capacity, hence their pro…tability in the second period. They show that asymmetric equilibria arise: in equilibrium, some …rms hedge, while others do not. In their model, the presence of …nancial constraints and the resulting potential underinvestment is the conduit for strategic interaction.
Similarly, Loss (2012) examines the interaction between hedging demand and the strategic characteristics of investment opportunities in the presence of …nancial constraints. He …nds that a …rm's hedging demand is high when investments are strategic substitutes, and low when they are strategic complements. In this article's setting, by contrast, pricing and hedging are part of the same strategy. Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) consider a duopoly with asymmetric exposure to an exchange rate, and determine the optimal pass-through and related exposure. While the problem is related to the one examined here, the analytical approach is very di¤erent: they treat exchange rate as a …xed input price, not as a stochastic variable. This article's contribution is therefore to analyze the strategic interactions between product market and hedging decisions of large corporations.
We focus the analysis on risk-averse …rms that hedge before deciding their product market strategies. As will be discussed, risk-aversion arises naturally from …nancial constraints. Hedging is a publicly observable commitment: We …rst analyze quantity competition. The necessary …rst-order conditions characterizing an equilibrium candidate of the production game are similar to the standard Cournot case, except that the expected risk-adjusted cost replaces the marginal cost. Investors value a marginal cost increase using the probability measure induced by their marginal utility of wealth in each state of the world, and not the physical probability measure. This expected risk-adjusted marginal cost is determined in equilibrium. It is decreasing in own hedging, and increasing in own production at the equilibrium. Thus, if a …rm increase its hedging, it becomes more aggressive (Lemma 1).
An equilibrium of the production game always exists. If the absolute risk aversion of pro…ts is "weakly" correlated to input cost (this statement is made precise in Section 5), this equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging reduces the other …rm's equilibrium output (Proposition 1). If a symmetric equilibrium of the hedging game exists, and absolute risk aversion of pro…ts is "weakly" correlated to input cost, hedging toughens quantity competition: …rms hedge more than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus commit themselves to produce more than if their costs were constant and equal to the expected cost under the physical probability measure (Proposition 2).
We establish similar results for di¤erentiated price competition; although with diametrically opposed implications. The expected risk-adjusted marginal cost, determined in equilibrium, replaces the constant marginal cost in the necessary …rst-order conditions characterizing an equilibrium candidate of the pricing game. It is decreasing in own hedging and decreasing in own price at the equilibrium. If a …rm increases its hedging, it becomes more aggressive (Lemma 2).
An equilibrium of the pricing game always exists. If absolute risk aversion is constant, the equilibrium is unique, and an increase in own hedging reduces the other …rm's equilibrium price. The crucial di¤erence compared to quantity competition is that, if a symmetric equilibrium of the hedging game exists and absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging softens quantity competition: …rms hedge less than their (anticipated) equilibrium production, thus commit themselves to a price higher than if their cost was constant equal to the expected cost (Proposition 3).
For ease of exposition, the unicity and comparative statics results when …rms compete in quantity are derived using the strong su¢ cient condition that risk aversion is constant. The weaker su¢ cient condition that absolute risk aversion of pro…ts is "weakly" correlated to input cost is derived in Propo-sition 4. Similarly, a weaker su¢ cient condition for hedging to soften price competition is presented in Proposition 5.
Finally, we examine the strategic incentives to commit to a hedging position (Proposition 6). Sofar, we have assumed that Boards of Directors impose that …rms commit to their hedging position to limit speculation by traders.
Ignoring that objective, does commitment arise in equilibrium? We …rst prove that committing is a …rm's the best response to the other not committing.
This result is all the more striking that both …rms committing is Pareto dominated if …rms compete in quantity. On the other hand, if …rms compete in price, commitment to a hedging strategy softens price competition. If demand is totally inelastic (Hotelling competition), and absolute risk aversion constant, the expected gain in retail pro…ts more than compensate the volatility increase, and commitment is a dominant strategy. Thus, whether …rms compete in quantity or in price, they have a strategic incentive to commit, as well as a risk control objective.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes quantity competition. Section 4 analyzes price competition.
Section 5 discusses robustness of the results. Section 6 examines incentives to commit to the hedging strategy. Finally, Section 7 discusses further research.
Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
The model

Demand and commercial pro…ts
Consider two symmetric …rms, indexed by i = 1; 2, competing à la Cournot. Firm i produces output q i , total production is Q = q i +q j , and inverse demand P (q i + q j ). To produce one unit of good or service, both …rms use one unit of the same input, at costc. Firm i's commercial pro…ts 1 for input costc is:
Assumption 1 For all Q 0, the inverse demand function P (:) satis…es
and
A (Q) = 0 and lim
where
Constant input cost
Before introducing uncertainty, it is useful to brie ‡y review the properties of the equilibrium when input costs are constant and equal to c i for each …rm i.
Then,
Condition 1 guarantees that
Thus, if a Cournot equilibrium exists, it is characterized by the necessary …rst-order conditions:
Assumption 1 guarantees that, for all c > 0,
admits a unique solution Q E (c). We further assume that
where D (:) is the demand function induced by P (:). This eliminates possible corner equilibria (e.g., q 1 = 0; q 2 > 0). Then, the equilibrium quantities are:
Finally, we verify in Appendix A that:
Uncertainty on input costs and risk management
We return to the random input cost case. Ex ante, the input costc is a random variable, distributed following cumulative distribution function G (:) 
Three empirically relevant timings
Three distinct timings are observed, that depend on the timing of the production decision:
1. Production then hedging: the …rms …rst decide on their production at t = 0, then on their hedging strategy at t = 1. Finally, input cost and pro…ts are realized at t = 2.
2. Hedging then production: the …rms …rst decide on their hedging strategy at t = 0, then on their production t = 1, before input cost and pro…ts are realized at t = 2.
3. Flexible production after input cost known: the …rms decide on their hedging strategy at t = 0, then on their production strategy at t = 2 after input cost is realized at t = 1. Finally, pro…ts are realized.
Since F is constant, hedging before or after production does not modify the (expected) gains. Consider now the production decision. Knowing that input costs will be perfectly covered at the forward price, …rms play a symmetric Cournot game with constant marginal costs equal to F , thus their equilibrium output is q E (F; F ).
Consider now timing 3: …rms set production after the input price is realized. The pro…t from the hedge is known before the production decision is made, thus has no impact on it. Firms cannot do any better than standard deterministic pro…t maximization. Knowing that, when …rms make the hedging decision, they follow the "standard" one-…rm risk management logic.
Thus, this article if focussed on situations where risk-averse …rms hedge before making their production decision.
Objective function
At t = 2 (i.e., once the input costc is known), the pro…t function of …rm i that has purchased forward quantity H i at the forward price F is:
The …rst expression of …rm i's pro…ts re ‡ects a purchase of input volume q i at costc, and pro…t (c F ) on the volume H i purchased forward at t = 0.
Alternatively, the …rm can consider its production cost is F , and that its exposition to input price ‡uctuations is (H i q i ).
We assume that …rms maximize some expected utility of pro…ts
where U (:) is increasing and (weakly) concave. To obtain a strategic impact of risk management, a crucial ingredient is that …rms are risk-averse. There are several possible reasons for this assumption. In the case of small …rm, owned and managed by the same person, the objective of this owner-manager is to maximize the expected utility of her wealth, the pro…t of the …rm being a large component of this wealth.
However, we are mostly interested in large …rms, typically owned by a di¤use population of small shareholders, and whose managers own only a small fraction of the shares. If managers act in the best interest of diversi…ed shareholders and the stock market is frictionless, the objective should be to maximize the expected present value of future pro…ts, where the expectation is taken under the risk adjusted distribution, which incorporates risk premia. It is thus legitimate for us to represent these shareholders'preferences by a concave function of future pro…ts, denoted U ( ). For simplicity, we consider a symmetric model where U (:) is the same for all …rms. We do not attempt to endogenize U (:) by modelling explicitly the …nancial frictions and the optimal …nancing and investment policies that give rise to this function U (:).
Consistent with the literature reviewed above, we further assume that
At date t = 0, the shareholder value of …rm i is then:
We look for subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage games played by …rms. We solve by backward induction: we …rst determine the unique the second-stage equilibrium q i (H i ; H j ) ; q j (H i ; H j ) , then insert its value into v i to obtain the …rst-stage payo¤ functions, denoted V i (H i ; H j ).
3 Over-hedging to commit to higher output
Random input costs: an illustrative example
Before solving the general case, we illustrate the main insights using a simple example: (i) absolute risk aversion is constant, which yields U (x) = 1 exp ( x), (ii) inverse demand is linear P (Q) = 1 Q, and (iii) input costc is normally distributed 2 , with mean F and standard deviation .
2 :
Replacing P (Q) by its expression, the …rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions characterizing the equilibrium are
for i = 1; 2, which yield the equilibrium
Thus,
The necessary …rst-order conditions are then:
We verify that
Replacing q i by q i (H i ; H j ) and solving for a symmetric equilibrium yields:
is the unique symmetric equilibrium output if marginal cost is constant and equal to F . Equilibrium output is then:
A few features of the analysis are worth noting. First, v i (q i ; q j ; H i ) is concave in q i , due to the concavity of the pro…t function R i and the risk aversion.
Second, the …rst order conditions (4) can be rewritten as
is the "risk adjusted" marginal cost, increasing in q i , decreasing in H i , and lower than the expected cost F if and only if H i > q i . Equilibrium of the production game is the solution of the system:
Finally, at the equilibrium, …rms hedge more than they will produce, i.e., H > q , which yields a risk-adjusted cost lower than F . Thus, …rms produce more than if costs were F : q > q E (F; F ). Random input costs lead to higher input and lower equilibrium price.
As we will see in the remainder of this article, these features also hold under more general conditions on utility, demand, and input cost distribution.
Equilibrium of the production game
Consider now a general speci…cation.
is the expected risk-adjusted cost, and
Since v i (q i ; q j ; H i ) is concave in q i , if an interior Nash equilibrium exists, it is determined by the …rst order conditions
for i = 1; 2.
Before proving existence of a Nash equilibrium and deriving su¢ cient conditions for unicity, we examine equation (6) . The interaction between hedging and production is channelled through the expected risk-adjusted cost c i (q i ; q j ; H i ), determined in equilibrium. If the …rm produces one more unit, it costsc in each state of the world. Investors value marginal cost using the probability measure induced by their marginal utility of wealth U 0 ( i ) in each state of the world, and not according to the physical probability measure.
From an investors'perspective, the risk-adjusted expectation of any random variable x (c) is:
The impact of q i , q j , and H i on the expected risk-adjusted cost is summarized in the following Lemma, proven in Appendix A:
A marginal increase in hedging increases the marginal pro…t from higher input cost. However, this favorable realization is weighted by a lower marginal utility, hence the risk-adjusted expected cost decreases. Thus, "ceteris paribus" increasing H i reduces …rm i expected risk-adjusted marginal cost.
Dependency of c i with respect to q i and q j is indirect, channelled through the marginal utility of pro…ts. If absolute risk-aversion is constant, c i depends only on q i and H i , which yields a more familiar Cournot game. Otherwise, the impact of q j on c i cannot be signed, that depend on the sign of (H i q i ).
At the equilibrium output, expected risk-adjusted marginal cost is increasing.
We now turn to existence and unicity of the equilibrium. Since we ultimately focus on symmetric equilibria,
we assume that H i and H j are "close enough" that c i and c j satisfy condition (3) , and the equilibrium of the production game is interior.
is thus a …xed point of the system:
Proposition 1 For any (H i ; H j ) "close enough", an equilibrium of the production game exists. If absolute risk aversion is constant, the equilibrium is unique, and a marginal increase in …rm i's hedging reduces …rm j's equilibrium output:
Proof.
Thus, we can limit our search to (q i ; q j ) 2 0; q E 2 . Since q E (x; y) and c (x; y; z) are continuous in all their arguments, and de…ned on a compact and convex set of R 2 , Brouwer theorem guarantees existence of an equilibrium.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, we prove in Appendix A that the real part of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
are negative, thus the equilibrium is unique. Finally, constant risk aversion implies @c i @q j q i ; q j ; H i = 0 by Lemma 1. Firms play a familiar Cournot game with marginal costs c i (q i ; H i ) increasing in q i at the equilibrium, and decreasing in H i . We prove in Appendix A that, since increasing hedging reduces a …rm's cost, it make her more aggressive, and reduces her competitor's output.
A marginal increase in H i commits …rm i to a higher output. This strategic e¤ect can be understood using three equivalent logics. A …rst logic is that a marginal increase in H i reduces q j , thus increases q i since quantities are strategic substitutes. A second logic is that a marginal increase in H i reduces the risk-adjusted cost, thus increases q i . A …nal logic is that a marginal increase in H i increases the volume exposed to input price ‡uctuations (H i q i ), thus …rm i must increase q i to reduce this exposure.
Equilibrium of the hedging game
Suppose a symmetric interior equilibrium of the hedging game (H ; H ) exists.
Proposition 2
1. The equilibrium is characterized by the necessary …rst-order conditions:
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, hedging toughens quantity competition: …rms over-hedge thus commit to higher equilibrium output than if marginal costs were constant equal to F
1. For i = 1; 2 ,the …rst-order conditions de…ning equilibrium hedging volume H i are:
c F , this yields:
Dividing by E [U 0 ( i )] > 0 and selecting H i = H j = H yields equation
2. Equations (7), (6) , and (5) yield:
Thus, at the symmetric equilibrium:
since P (2q) + qP 0 (2q) is decreasing by Condition 1.
A marginal increase in H i has two e¤ects on …rm's i expected utility. First, a direct expected cost e¤ect: the …rm substitutes input at known cost F for input at uncertain costc. When taking the risk-ajusted expectation, this substitution is worth (c i (q i ; q j ; H i ) F ). Second, an indirect e¤ect, through the change in the other …rm's production:
. At the equilibrium, both e¤ects exactly cancel out for both …rms, which produces equilibrium conditions (7).
Thus, since @q j @H i (H ; H ) < 0 and P 0 (Q ) q i < 0, …rms set c i q i ; q j ; H i < F : …rms over hedge, i.e., hedge more than their (anticipated) production, so that their risk-adjusted expected marginal cost is lower than their "true" expected marginal cost E [c] = F . This then leads them to become more aggressive, and produce more than if they were completed covered.
Finally, combining …rst-order conditions (6) and (7) yields:
for i = 1; 2. Comparing with …rst-order condition (2) for c i = F , an additional 
Demand and constant input costs
Consider two symmetric …rms that compete in price. Firm i faces demand
, decreasing in own price and increasing in the other …rm's price, and constant input cost c i . With a slight abuse, we use the same notation as for quantity competition. Firm's i pro…t is
(ii) for all (c i ; c j ) "close enough" 3 , the pricing game with constant costs c i and c j has a unique interior equilibrium
(iii) prices are strategic complements:
and (iv) own price e¤ ect is stronger than other's price e¤ ect:
Assumptions 2 is met for example for a linear Hotelling demand:
in which case equilibrium prices are:
Concavity of the objective function and strategic complementarity of prices are met by many demand functions. Unicity of equilibrium with constant in- 3 As in the Cournot case, jci cjj must be small enough to avoid a corner equilibrium Di p put costs is required to establish unicity with stochastic input costs. We prove in Appendix A that own price e¤ect stronger than other's price e¤ect is su¢ cient to guarantee that an increase in one …rm's cost increases both
Random input costs
Firm i's pro…ts for input pricec is:
The expected value for shareholders is
, the equilibrium of the pricing game for hedging volumes (H i ; H j ), the expected value of …rm i is 
As proven in Appendix B, the risk adjusted expected cost present similar properties to the Cournot case: Lemma 2 For any (H i ; H j ):
For any (p i ; p j ; H i ):
The equilibrium of the two-stage game is then characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 1. For any (H i ; H j ) "close enough", there exists an interior equilibrium of the pricing game characterized by equations (9) for i = 1; 2:
2. If absolute risk aversion is constant, this equilibrium is unique, and a marginal hedging increase by …rm i reduces …rm j's equilibrium price:
3. If an interior equilibrium H i ; H j of the hedging game exists, it is characterized by
If a symmetric interior equilibrium exists, and absolute risk aversion is
constant, hedging softens price competition: …rms under-hedge to com-mit to higher prices than if marginal costs were constant and equal to F :
Proof. The proof follows the steps of Propositions 1 and 2. Details are presented in Appendix B. The risk-adjusted costs are bounded, thus the sets in which we look for a …xed point is compact and convex in R 2 . Since all functions are continuous, Brouwer's …xed point theorem guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then Assumption 2 guarantees unicity of the equilibrium and the direction of the strategic e¤ ect.
Equation (10) is derived similarly to equation (7) . Comparison of equations (10), (8), and (9), proves that hedging softens price competition.
Combining the …rst-order conditions yields:
Hedging creates a strategic e¤ect, captured by the term
. Publicly keeping a portion of their input price exposure uncovered commits …rms to raise prices to reduce demand, hence exposure. This commitment then yields a higher equilibrium price : p > p E (F; F ).
The direction of the strategic e¤ect is reversed compared to Cournot competition: here, …rms under-hedge, hence increase the equilibrium price. This stark di¤erence is best understood by comparing the …rst-order conditions:
In both cases, when …rm i increases hedging, …rm j reduces her strategic variable (quantity or price). If …rms compete in quantity, when …rm j increases output, he reduces …rm's i pro…t @ i @q j < 0 , therefore, at the equilibrium, …rm i hedges to set her expected risk adjusted cost lower than F , i.e., becomes more aggressive. Conversely, if …rms compete in price, when …rm j raises his price, he increases …rm i pro…t @ i @p j > 0 , hence …rm i hedges to set her risk adjusted cost higher than F , i.e., becomes less aggressive.
Robustness of the results
Constant absolute risk aversion is the single su¢ cient condition for (i) the second-stage equilibrium to be unique, and (ii) hedging to toughen quantity competition. This condition is extremely strong. We derive in Appendix C the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for these properties. All can be cast as an upper bound on
We observe that b E [ ( i ) (c i c)] is bounded above:
Thus, S de…ned as
is not empty since ( max min ) (c c) 2 S. R = inf (S) exists, and
Proposition 4 If the covariance of input costs and the risk aversion of pro…ts is lower than a threshold, that depends on the convexity of inverse demand P (:), the equilibrium of the production game is unique and hedging toughens quantity competition. Speci…cally, the su¢ cient condition for unicity of the equilibrium and
Proof. Details of the proof are presented in Appendix C. We derive su¢ cient conditions for each property, then we determine the highest upper bound such that all three su¢ cient conditions are satis…ed.
If absolute risk aversion is constant, max = min , these su¢ cient conditions are met for any inverse demand function and any bounded distribution of input costs. If absolute risk aversion is not constant, which is more realistic, they provide an upper on the covariance between risk aversion of pro…t and input cost.
A similar analysis can be conducted for price competition, although the algebra is more cumbersome. De…ne
m exists, since the function is continuous on a compact, and m > 0 since
We prove in Appendix C that:
Proposition 5 If the covariance of risk aversion of pro…ts with input cost is lower than m, hedging softens price competition:
6 Strategic incentive to commit to a hedging position Their pro…ts' volatility is increased, hence, ceteris paribus, their expected utility is decreased.
Second, if …rms compete in quantity, commitment yields higher output, hence lower price. Thus we expect commitment yields a Pareto inferior outcome. On the other hand, if …rms compete in price, commitment yields higher price, thus, if total demand is very inelastic (e.g., Hotelling competition), higher pro…ts, which may compensate for the reduction in volatility.
In this Section, we re…ne this intuition. Consider a new game. The timing is now as follows: at t = 0, …rms either Commit (C) or Not Commit (N C) to their initial hedging strategy. At t = 1, …rms determine and publicly announce their initial hedging strategy. At t = 2, they determine and publicly announce their output (or price). Finally, at t = 3, if they have not committed at t = 0, they can modify their initial hedging strategy. Then, input cost is realized, and pro…ts are determined.
The expected utility to …rm i that plays strategy X i 2 fC; N Cg while …rm j plays strategy X j 2 fC; N Cg is V i (X i ; X j )
To focus on the strategic impact of hedging, we continue to assume that Hedging before or after playing the product market game does not modify the (expected) gains.
We assume that the equilibrium of the second stage is unique (for example, constant risk aversion), and that a unique symmetric equilibrium of the hedging game exists.
Proposition 6
1. Not Committing cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Whether …rms compete in quantity or in price, and is a dominant strategy
Proof. We …rst prove point 1 if …rms compete in quantity. Suppose …rm 2 plays N C. If …rm 1 plays N C, its expected utility is V 1 (N C; N C). Suppose now …rm 1 plays C. At t = 3, …rm 2 optimally selects H 2 = q 2 . At t = 2, both …rms select output. Assuming a unique interior equilibrium (q 1 (H 1 ) ; q 2 (H 1 ))
exists, it is characterized by:
is a solution of the system, hence is the unique equilibrium for H 1 = q E (F; F ). Thus, since there is no guarantee that H 1 = q E (F; F ) is optimal, we must have:
The proof of point 1 proceeds along the same lines if …rms compete in price, and is presented in Appendix D, along with formal proof of the other points.
As expected, when …rms compete in quantity, (C; C) yields lower price and higher volatility, hence is Pareto inferior to (N C; N C). On the other hand, if …rms compete à la Hotelling, the expected retail pro…t increase compensates for the loss from increased volatility, hence (i) Committing is Pareto superior:
V (C; C) > V (N C; N C), and (ii) is the best response to the other …rm's Committing: V (C; C) > V (N C; C).
The …rst point is striking: even though both …rms Non Committing is
Pareto superior for …rms competing in quantity, an individual …rm prefers to
Commit when the other one does not, since she can always do strictly better than replicating the Non Committing outcome.
Thus, whether …rms compete in quantity or in price, they have a strategic incentive to commit, as well as a risk control objective.
Concluding remarks
This article examines how …rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where risk averse …rms decide on their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We …nd that hedging modi…es the pricing and production strategies of …rms. This strategic e¤ect is channelled through the expected risk-adjusted cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the measure induced by investors'risk aversion, and has diametrically opposed impacts depending on the nature of product market competition: hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, committing to a hedging strategy is always a best response to non committing, and is a dominant strategy if …rms compete à la
Hotelling.
This work can be expanded in many directions. First, it would be interesting to endogenize pricing ‡exibility. We have assumed that industry practices dictate whether prices are ‡exible or not. This is true in practice. However, we would like to know under what conditions price ‡exibility is indeed an equilibrium.
Second, it would be interesting to examine asymmetric situations, such as when one …rm is market leader and announces its hedging strategy before the other, or when di¤erent …rms have di¤erent costs.
Finally, it would be interesting to test empirically these models' predictions, in particular whether …rms incorporate their and their competitors' hedging in their pricing strategies. The airlines industry appears to o¤er fertile ground for analysis: airlines face volatile fuel cost, and appear to have retained some pricing power, at least on some routes. Furthermore, as evidenced by the rich academic literature (e.g., Carter, Rogers, and Simkins A Quantity competition
Hence,
The necessary conditions characterizing the equilibrium q i (
of the production game are
Assuming an equilibrium exists and is given by the …rst-order conditions, total di¤erentiation of the system of two equations with respect to H i yields:
A.1 Impact of c i on q E i and q E j (constant input costs)
Suppose …rst the marginal costs are constant, i.e., c i (q i ; q j ; H i ) = c i .
> <
> :
Then:
A.2 Properties of the expected risk-adjusted cost (Lemma 1)
For any (q i ; q j ; H i ),
For any (H i ; H j ) ;
Thus:
Since (:) and U 0 (:) are both non-increasing,
Finally, for any (q i ; q j ; H i ),
A.3 Existence and unicity of equilibrium (Proposition 1)
For existence, we apply Brouwer's …xed point theorem to the function ,
Since q E (x; y) and c (x; y; z) are continuous in all their arguments, we need only to establish that (q i ; q j ) lies in a compact and convex set of R 2 . Since e c c,
for all (q i ; q j ; H i ). Thus, since q E i is increasing in c j and decreasing in c i :
Since q i 0 by de…nition,we can limit our search for a …xed point to the compact and convex set 0; q E 2 . Brouwer's theorem then applies, and there exists a …xed point, i.e., an equilibrium. This equilibrium (q 1 ; q 2 ) is unique if the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) are negative, where
The eigenvalues are the roots of:
where T r is the trace of J (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) and Det its determinant. The roots are:
If T r 2 4Det < 0, the two roots are complex and conjugate. Their real part is negative if and only if T r < 0. If T r 2 4Det 0, the two roots are real.
T r + p T r 2 4Det < 0 requires T r < 0. Then, it also requires Det > 0.
Thus, we require T r < 0 and Det > 0.
From Lemma 1,
We now examine Det (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ).
A.4 Impact of H i on q j with constant absolute risk aversion (Proposition 1)
If is constant,
> 0:
B Price competition
Firm's i pro…t is:
hence:
The necessary …rst-order conditions characterizing an interior equilibrium 
B.2 Properties of the risk-adjusted expected cost (Lemma 2)
The same derivation as for Cournot competition yields:
Finally:
Since (:) and U 0 (:) are both non-increasing, cov
B. 
To apply Brouwer's …xed point theorem, we need only to establish that (p i ; p j ) lies in a compact and convex set of R 2 . Sincec c,
for all (p i ; p j ; H i ). Thus, since p E i is increasing in c i and in c j :
Since p i 0 by de…nition, we can limit our search for a …xed point to the compact and convex set 0; p E (c; c) 2 . Brouwer's theorem then applies, and there exists a …xed point, i.e., an equilibrium.
This equilibrium (p 1 ; p 2 ) is unique if T r < 0 and Det > 0. Then:
By Assumption 2,
hence A (p 1 ; p 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) < 0; hence T r (p 1 ; p 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) < 2 < 0.
Hence, if is constant,
and Det (p 1 ; p 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) > 0.
B.3.2 Equilibrium of the hedging game
The …rst order condition is
, and
Dividing by
Observing that
yields equation (10).
B.3.3 Sign of
with constant absolute risk aversion
Thus, at the symmetric equilibrium,
Consider p (c) de…ned implicitly by
is the derivative of D (:; :) with respect to its …rst argument. dp dc =
C Robustness analysis: proof of Propositions 4 and 5 C.1 Su¢ cient condition for the unicity of the equilibrium of the production game
We …rst derive a su¢ cient condition for T r (q 1 ; q 2 ; 
The inequality is equivalent to:
the left hand side is bounded above by
1 by Assumption 1, the right hand side is bounded below
We now derive a su¢ cient condition for Det (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) > 0. From the analysis above,
The left hand side is bounded above by P 0 (Q )
Thus, for any k 2 (1; 2) ;
We choose k = 3 p 3 = max k2(1;2) min p 2 (k 1); (2 k) , thus, if
The same derivations for P 00 (Q) < 0 yield q E R 2 p 3 3 ) Det (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) > 0 and T r (q 1 ; q 2 ; H 1 ; H 2 ) k;
and for P 00 (Q) = 0
C.2 Su¢ cient condition for
Lemma 3 Consider a symmetric equilibrium, H i = H j = H , and q i = q j = q (H ; H ).
Proof. We …rst prove that
Thus, P 0 (Q) @c i @q i + @c i @q j q i ; q j ; H i ; H j < 0 f or i = 1; 2 ) > 0:
Thus, since 3 (q i ; q j ; H i ) > 0, 2 (q ; q ; H ) = P 0 (Q) + q i P 00 (Q) @c i @q j (q ; q ; H ) < 0 , @q j @H i (H ; H ) :
To complete the proof, we show that 2 (q ; q ; H ) < 0. As in the Cournot case, if …rm 1 chooses H 1 = D p E (F; F ) ; p E (F; F ) , p 1 = p 2 = p E (F; F ) is a solution of the system, hence the unique equilibrium.
Both …rms receive V (N C; N C). Thus, V (C; N C) V (N C; N C).
Then
Thus, if the …rm hedges Condition 1 implies that f (:) is globally concave and admits a unique maximum x de…ned by: f 0 (x ) = P (2x ) F + 2x P 0 (2x ) = 0:
hence q E (F; F ) > x . Then,f q E (F; F ) > f (q ) since q > q E (F; F ) and which is veri…ed numerically for all a 0.
